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Terrorism (https://www.egmontinstitute.be/core/terrorism/)
In 2021, the jihadi threat will likely retain two main dimensions: one linked to the caliphate’s
legacy; and the other stemming from fringe extremists. Altogether, these two con�gurations
suggest that jihadi terrorism will remain a key security concern for a long time to come. The
terrorist threat might be lower than it was in 2014-16, but the “new normal” is a higher threat
level than during previous decades – something that could still be further exacerbated by
other phenomena, such as far-right extremism, polarisation or bad counter-terrorism policies.
This opinion was �rst published by the 




The caliphate’s legacy and fringe extremists
The arrest of a returning foreign �ghter earlier this month 
, suspected of planning a terrorist attack, highlights the persistence of the jihadi threat
in Europe. This follows a 
 and plots across Europe in the latter part of
2020, notably in France and Austria. The sum of these attacks re�ects well the current threat
from jihadi terrorism, which we will continue facing in 2021. The jihadi threat will likely retain
two main dimensions: one linked to the caliphate’s legacy; and the other stemming from fringe
extremists.
The Caliphate’s Legacy
ISIS’s caliphate in Iraq and Syria no longer exists, but its legacy is set to weight on the terrorist
threat in Europe for years, and probably decades to come. There are two key aspects to this
legacy worth highlighting. First, the caliphate has created an unprecedented contingent of
violent extremists and sympathisers that will need to be managed over the long term. This
contingent includes �rst and foremost the so-called “returnees”. While a majority of returnees
may have distanced themselves from ISIS or violent extremism, others will likely remain
committed to the ideology, and perhaps engaged in propaganda, recruitment or even violent
activities, as illustrated by the recent arrest in Spain. Some of these returnees already pose a
challenge in prison (again a minority, but one that was involved in plots or recruitment
activities), and they will continue to raise concern upon their release (in spite of 
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).
Next are the so-called “frustrated travellers” who were arrested and jailed before they could
join ISIS in Syria. Not having been able to demonstrate their commitment to the cause, nor
possibly having suffered disillusion with ISIS (unlike many returnees), some of these
individuals may be 
, as illustrated by last year’s attacks in 
and 
, perpetrated by such frustrated travellers. Then is
the larger group of individuals who radicalised during the caliphate’s era and sympathised
with the jihadi ideology, without seeking to travel to Syria. Many of these individuals were
simply attracted by the “coolness” of ISIS propaganda, identifying with a certain subculture
and a sense of belonging, and have already turned to new fashionable attitudes or returned to
petty crime. Other sympathisers will remain convinced over the long term, however, and
contribute to the further spreading of this toxic ideology in Europe. Finally, the hundreds of
European foreign �ghters currently 
, in addition to those still �ghting in
the region, will remain a key concern for years to come – whether they are repatriated or not.
Not all of them are equally dangerous, but among them are some very dangerous individuals
(well-connected and trained) who might seek to plan or incite violent actions in Europe.
There is therefore an unprecedented contingent of potential jihadi terrorists, preachers,
recruiters, facilitators and sympathisers in Europe. However, the caliphate’s legacy is not just
about people, as it is also about ideas. There is an incalculable number of videos, audios,
writings of all kinds that were produced by ISIS propaganda machinery, and which will
continue to circulate online for many years. More signi�cantly, the key legacy will be the
“myth” of the caliphate as a life-changing experience, as a possible ideal to inspire future
generations of terrorists, as the apex of a never-ending war between “true believers” and
“non-believers”. Anecdotes and stories about battles, life on the front, or good life under the
caliphate will continue to nurture this myth for decades to come. The ashes of the caliphate
are equally nurturing the beast: the illegal detention of European foreign �ghters and children
in Northeast Syria in what is now called “
” feeds the jihadi narrative and demeans the European value-based
counter-terrorism approach. The caliphate’s contingent will continue feeding the myth; and in
turn, the myth allows the contingent to continue striving and recruiting.
Fringe Extremists
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stems from individuals on the fringes of known extremist milieus. A number of recent attacks
or plots in Europe were committed by individuals that were unknown from the security
services, with little or no connections with known radicals, such as the 
 on the former of�ces of Charlie Hebdo in September 2020. These
extremists mostly radicalised in the post-caliphate era, thus absent the strong pull factor of
the “appeal of the caliphate”, and without the opportunity – or certainly less so – to travel and
wage jihad abroad. In several cases, these terrorist plotters did not even pledge allegiance to a
speci�c group, nor did any group claim the attack. Some call them “lone wolves” or “lone
actors”, some call this “impulsive terrorism” or “fanaticism”. While there is nothing new in
attacks perpetrated by lone actors or individuals unknown from the services, it is important to
recognise the existence of this more elusive form of extremism post-caliphate, and to
understand how this threat differs from the caliphate’s legacy.
The future jihadist threat in Europe
While these two con�gurations of the jihadi threat are clearly very different, one should not
necessarily conceive them as entirely disconnected. Post-caliphate fringe extremists can
consume ISIS virtual material, interact with ISIS contingent and be inspired by them.
Allegedly, for instance, the murderer of French teacher Samuel Paty 
 with a Russian �ghter in Syria. Conversely, impulsive fringe
extremists could maintain the threat high through their acts, and perhaps even emulate
similar actions from hard-core jihadists. Altogether, these two con�gurations suggest that
jihadi terrorism will remain a key security concern for a long time to come. The terrorist
threat might be lower than it was in 2014-16, but the “new normal” is a higher threat level
than during previous decades – something that could still be further exacerbated by other
phenomena, such as far-right extremism, polarisation or bad counter-terrorism policies.
Of course, jihadi terrorism will not be the only threat on the horizon in 2021. The 
 on 6 January was a stark reminder of the threat from right-
wing extremism and other potentially violent conspiracy movements, which are present in
Europe as well. Whereas European counter-terrorism efforts were largely focused on the
jihadi threat over the past years, 2021 will call for a simultaneous focus on a persistent jihadi
threat and the greater danger from other forms of violent extremism.
Overall, this analysis indicates that a long-term commitment to preventing and responding to
terrorism is needed. The counter-terrorism arsenal has been strengthened quite signi�cantly
over the past few years across Europe, in response to the unprecedented jihadi threat. In light
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Rather, it is important to consolidate what has been achieved, and adjust the existing
instruments to better cope with other forms of extremism, mainly right-wing extremism. We
do not necessarily need new instruments or powers, but we must remain vigilant and agile in
responding to an evolving threat, while avoiding any form of excessive over-reaction.
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